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MR. KOLB: I think we are particularly fortunate in the panelists who
have assembled for this discussion. And I want to introduce each of
them in a moment. Let me first just take a brief bit of time to describe for
you what we hope to do today, which is to focus on what we think, within
the general scope of merger standards, is the most important issue that
we are facing at this time.

We think the key issue is the new legislation that has been proposed in
Congress, which is aimed squarely at putting a limit on the size of
corporations through limitations on their ability to enter into mergers.
The principal focus is conglomerate mergers. And without stating the
case for the pro and the con view on the legislation, let me just say that it
appears to present for our country a very substantial question of policy.
1639
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The best way to define the legislation is to simply state that each of the
forms of legislation proposed suggests that a cap, a numerical value, be
placed on the size of mergers that will be permitted or mergers that will
be permitted by corporations of particular size. A figure such as $2
billion, $3 billion, etc., may be used as the threshold figure, and over and
above that figure, a corporation of that size could not merge with
another corporation of a particular size. There is enough variation in
the threshold tests that I do not think we should try to be more specific
now, except to tell you that that is step one in the legislation.
Step two in most of the proposed drafts is to provide defenses,
defenses that a party trying to undertake such a merger would be able to
assert as a basis for justifying the merger, even though it was over the
threshold test. For purposes of introduction, following is the statement
of some of the defenses that might be permitted from one of the draft
bills.
One, the transaction will have the preponderant effect of substantially
enhancing competition; two, the transaction will result in substantial
efficiencies; three, within one year before or after the consummation of
the transaction, the parties thereto shall have divested one or more
viable business units, the assets and revenues of which are equal to or
greater than the assets and revenues of the smaller party to the
transaction.
Others have proposed that there be no defenses, but for the most part
the view up to now has been that some defense should be allowed, so as
to permit corporations to acquire at least something after they have
passed over the threshold test.
Just one further thing. A fundamental tenet for the proponents of this
legislation is that it represents an effort to deal with bigness. We have for
years in our antitrust legislation heard that it does not quite reach the
point of declaring bigness to be bad. This legislation, in a somewhat less
varnished form, basically would say that beyond a point we will regard
bigness as having effects detrimental to our society.
Now, let me introduce for you the people we have assembled for this
panel. I am very grateful that they all could attend. First of all, down on
my left, the far left, is David Boies. David is Chief Counsel for the Senate
Judiciary Committee, the committee before which much of the legislation will be discussed. I think it would be fair to identify David in general
terms as a proponent of legislation in this area, though I do not want to
speak for him.
Sitting next to David-and we put the two of them together for
obvious reasons-is Ed Large, who is General Counsel and VicePresident of United Technologies Corporation (UT), one of the fine
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corporations of America that has made a habit in recent years of
entering into very large acquisitions. Mr. Large is not a proponent of the
legislation.
Directly next to me, on the other side of Mr. Large, is Sandy Pfunder.
Sandy is the Assistant Director for Evaluation of the Federal Trade
Commission. He is known to many of you as the father of Hart-ScottRodino regulations. And most importantly, he is here today to speak for
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which is for the legislation.
On my immediate right is Joseph Bauer. Professor Bauer is from
Notre Dame Law School. He has written an important article on the
subject of conglomerate mergers. Professor Bauer purports to be
objective on the subject.
On my far right is Tom Dieterich. Tom is a partner at Sherman and
Sterling. He specializes in antitrust work. And he has just completed
what we hope will be close to the final draft of the merger standards
monograph that this committee has been working on for some years.
Tom is the chairman of the committee that has done the tremendous
work on that document. It traces the history of merger standards in the
United States. And he is, I think, in a particularly fine position to give us
a historical perspective. As to Tom's position, I will say nothing.
Now, let me say first that some of the speakers particularly would like
to make an opening statement. For the most part, we intend to conduct
this program in as free flow a form as possible. We do not have a fixed
format. But we do think it would be useful for those persons who would
like to make an opening statement to do so, and then for the others to
respond if they wish. After that, I am going to ask some very broad
questions and let the speakers debate these very important subjects back
and forth.
Professor Bauer has indicated that what he would like to do first-and
we are going to let him start off-is to try to give us a broad indication of
what the issues are, to try to set the scene. And following that, Ed Large
is going to want to make a statement, which I think is very much against
this legislation. And we will follow with the other speakers. Professor
Bauer.
PROFESSOR BAUER: Thank you. I appreciate the plug for my article.'
I did not even pay for that. But I think it is fair to say that the conclusions

'Bauer, ChallengingConglomerateMergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Today's Law and
Tomorrow's Legislation, 58 BOSTON U.L. REV. 199 (1978).
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from the article that I wrote are that conglomerate mergers, by and
large, are getting out of hand. And I proposed legislation which was not
identical to the Kennedy bill, but which offered the same general
approach.
The billing that I have is as an academician, so what I am going to do is
bring back some of those lovely days at law school, by asking questions
and not giving you any answers. What I thought would be useful is to
attempt to identify some of the issues raised in the conglomerate merger
area. I am afraid, however, that, although discussions of these proposals
are provocative and controversial, they may not be terribly fruitful. It is
the reasons for this lack of productivity which I would like to attempt to
identify.
First of all, let us start with the area in which there is little, if any,
disagreement. Although one could quarrel with the relevant statistics to
choose, the base years to be chosen, the effects of inflation, and so on, an
examination of the raw data will indicate that the absolute size of
American corporations has grown over the past several decades.
Furthermore, there has been some increase in the concentration
ratios-the share of the market held by the four largest firms-in a
number of major industries. And there also has been a growth in total
industrial concentration-the share of the American economy held by
the 200 or 500 largest corporations.
There is greater disagreement as to what I will call the "why" question.
Is this growth, both of relative and in absolute size of American
industries, the result of internal expansion or the result of mergers,
including those of the conglomergite variety? I believe the evidence is
ambiguous. And I would suggest that we answpr this question by
admitting that some, but clearly not all, growth is the result of mergers
and that, for the moment, we ought not seek to identify statistically how
dramatic the effect of mergers has been.
Now on to the area of true disagreement, which I will label the "so
what?" inquiry. Even if it is true that mergers have resulted in some
increases in size and concentration, should we be concerned about this
phenomenon? Here it is important to identify some of the specific
battlegrounds. Some argue that mergers, including the conglomerate
variety, yield economic benefits. They produce companies which are
more efficient, allowing the production qf more and better goods and
services at lower prices. Others argue that there are no true economic
efficiencies, but only greater ease of access to capital or financial markets.
Next, some argue that mergers are useful ways to replace old and
inefficient management. Opponents of conglomerate mergers, on the
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other hand, urge that they may contribute to oligopolistic practices. The
argument is made that America needs the large companies which flow
from these mergers better to compete in international markets against
monopolies assisted by foreign governments. Some argue that the larger
companies resulting from the mergers will have an undesirable amount
of political power or will cause social disruption. Others argue that not
only is this premise unproven, but even if true, it is an irrelevant
consideration for the antitrust laws. And the list of disagreements could
be extended for several more hours.
Finally, why the disagreements? What hope is there for consensus?
The difficulty, I suggest, flows from at least three phenomena. First,
most, if not all, of the assertions are simply not subject to empirical
proof. The scientists would run an experiment. Two test tubes would be
filled with the same chemicals; then, one would be treated differently
from the other controlled sample. But we have no way of running such
an experiment in our economy. We simply cannot say what would have
happened had the merger not taken place, after it is consummated.
The second source of disagreement is whether the merger question is
itself the problem or only one aspect of a larger problem, i.e., the
growing size of American companies. Does it make any difference
whether Exxon or General Motors get to be $60 billion corporations
through mergers or through internal growth? If the answer is no, then
opposing large conglomerate mergers only attacks a portion of the
problem. Perhaps the focus of the debate should shift back to the
proposal made by the late Senator Philip Hart, to break up many large
American corporations in oligopolistic industries.
The final source of disagreement is obvious once we expressly admit
what we all recognize-that antitrust is not a value free enterprise.
Should the antitrust laws be limited, as Professors Bork and Posner
would argue, solely to the advancement of economic goals? Is there not
room for achieving political and social objectives as well? And what
presumptions or burdens of proof are appropriate? Is the Business
Roundtable right, that we must leave American industry alone until and
unless the government can meet the burden of proof of showing that a
merger will have adverse effects? Or should we admit that it may be
quite difficult to prove that the damage is clear, but that we should
nonetheless lock the barn door before the horses escape?
The debate could continue. But I suggest that, although this discussion is-at least I hope it will be-interesting and provocative, we are
unlikely to reach any kind of concrete result. What we are going to
achieve--either today or more likely sometime down the road-is some
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sort of compromise. That is inevitable, because what we are doing is
attempting to resolve economic questions in a political arena.
MR. KOLB: The next speaker, I think, is not in doubt as to his position
on how we are to answer the questions which Professor Bauer has listed.
Let me turn to Ed Large, who is the Senior Vice-President and General
Counsel of United Technologies, and hear the point of view that is very
much against this legislation.
MR. LARGE: I welcome this opportunity to present the view from
United Technologies.
United Technologies was billed here as "acquisitive" and I guess you
can call us that-at least if you define the word acquisitive as having a
desire to acquire. Certainly the four major acquisitions we've made in
the last five years couldn't have been made without a strong desire. But if
you define acquisitive as the desire to acquire merely for the sake of
acquiring and possessing, then, just as certainly, we would not qualify at
United Technologies.
We never have had any desire to acquire just for the sake of acquiring.
The acquisitions we have made were part of a carefully reasoned
strategy to diversify, to build greater stability by expanding our
industrial-commercial base and by increasing our international presence. I believe our growth at United Technologies has been good for
everyone-shareowners, employees, customers, suppliers, and the communities where we do business.
But as I look at the current American business scene, I feel very much
like Alice in Wonderland. We've got Mad Hatters spouting nonsense
rhymes about the need for ever more legislation. We've got antibusiness,
antimerger advocates seeking simplistic solutions under the guise of
antitrust by emulating the Queen of Hearts and shouting at business:
"Off with their heads."
Of course, challenge is nothing new to American business. Competition has always been the catalyst for achievement in our free-market
system. But more and more, we're facing competition of a new kind. We
don't welcome it because it's not fair. The challenge is coming from the
deliberately orchestrated policies of some foreign governments. Their
goal is to increase the consolidation of their large industrial-based
corporations to achieve economies of scale. They do this through
carefully planned merger programs, through lavish tax and financing
incentives, through protective national purchasing policies, and sometimes even through direct government ownership.
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State-owned or state-controlled companies have obvious built-in
advantages in their home markets. As extensions of the state, they are
given special preference when dealing with their government. They can
be and are used to support local enterprises. Perhaps most important,
many of them operate at home and abroad without the need to earn a
profit. New investment capital flows as needed from a seemingly
bottomless well of government grants, loans, and subsidies. Although
Britain's new government is moving to rein in their investment subsidy
programs, the rest of Europe is not following suit. As one top French
official recently said: "We're going in the opposite direction." French
investor subsidies are expected to top $1 billion this year. The Italian
government has dispensed nearly $20 billion in the past decade. And
just two weeks ago, the West German government urged Germany's two
largest aircraft manufacturers, MBB and VFW-Fokker, to merge to remain
competitive internationally.
At a time when other governments are openly supporting efforts by
their national companies to combine for greater marketing strength and
economies of scale, some people in our government are preaching a
gospel of limited growth-that bigness is badness. The proponents of
the bigness is badness legislation seek to correct what they imagine to be
the political and social evils produced by our economic system. They
seem to be saying our system is bad because it breeds corporations so big
they are politically accountable to no one, so profit-oriented they
threaten our social well-being.
Now, I've looked long and hard for this political muscle we are
supposed to have. I just can't find it. What I do find is American business
being tied up more and more in a tangle of regulatory red tape'that
restricts and governs its decisions on how to hire and pay employees,
how to finance plants and where to locate them, how to compete and
expand, how to advertise, what to report to shareowners, and what new
products to market.
Quite simply, what the antimerger advocates are afraid of just is not
happening. Let me give you a'n example of what is happening. One of the
reasons for the modest success we've enjoyed was our merger with Otis
Elevator in 1976. The merger was good for us, but it was also good for
Otis. Otis's market share since the acquisition has remained fairly
constant. To maintain this share against such large companies as Hitachi
of Japan, Thyssen of Germany, and Westinghouse, Otis simply had to be
of comparable scale. The merger with United Technologies has given
Otis that scale. As a result, Otis's investment in R&D and product
improvement has nearly doubled since the merger. Its operating
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performance and efficiency have also improved. Despite sluggishness in
the construction industry, with new starts way down, 1978 was the best
year ever in the one-hundred-twenty-five-year history of Otis.
Building companies that are successful improves more than just their
own balance sheets. It also improves the lot of other companies and
individuals and, through them, has a multiplier effect on the communities where they operate. For example, prior to the merger, Otis had
more than 13,000 vendors in North America. Today, Otis has more than
17,000. Otis's headquarters in New York City continues to support a
broad variety of health and welfare, educational, and cultural activities.
Since the merger, Otis's contributions have increased by more than
one-third. The merger has been sound for Otis employees as well.
There have been wide-ranging improvements in employee benefits and
programs. We have instituted a savings plan, a dental assistance plan,
and more than 100 affirmative action programs.
Otis, its employees, its suppliers, and the communities where it is
located have all been helped by the merger with United Technologies.
Truly, everyone has benefited. But under the restrictions on size in the
proposed legislation, our merger with Otis would not have been
allowed. It's ironic to me that at a time when American industry is
struggling to curb inflation, create jobs, and sharpen its competitiveness
in the world marketplace, our government would be dreaming up ever
more legislative ways to tighten the handcuffs of business.
More than ever, markets are nowadays transcending national boundaries. America sells abroad. Foreign producers sell here. Industrialized
nations everywhere are vying for trade. How many of you, for example,
drive German cars, watch Japanese television sets, use Italian typewriters, drink French wine, or fly British-powered aircraft? For American
companies to compete against huge foreign enterprises, we have to be
big and we have to be efficient. It takes a lot of people and resources to
develop, manufacture, market, and service something as complex as ajet
engine or a modern elevator system.
We're hearing a lot these days about Chrysler and its problems, and
that with its $16 billion plus of sales in 1978, it's the tenth largest
industrial firm in the United States. Chrysler is big. But I wonder how
many Americans know that Chrysler's Japanese partner, the Mitsubishi
Group, is nearly three times larger with annual sales of $44 billion! And
the Japanese government certainly isn't concerned about Mitsubishi's
size---except to hope it gets even larger.
Instead of devising ways to shackle American business, it seems to me
our government should be trying to help it become more competitive.
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Rather than stifle corporate growth through unwarranted and artificial
barriers, the U.S. government should be stimulating its companies to
achieve the strength and diversity and efficiency needed to book
business abroad and provide jobs here at home.
It's time for government and business to stop working at crosspurposes and start working together to keep our economy healthy,
competitive, and growing. If we are unable or unwilling to work
together to meet these new challenges to our free-market system, our
businesses will lose more and more sales. Without sales, we won't need
production. And without production, we certainly won't need people.
And while some may have other opinions, we all know that lawyers are
people too!
That's the view of United Technologies.
MR. KOLB: Thank you, Ed. As Professor Bauer would say, there are
many questions and we are not sure that we can get an answer to any of
them. And Ed Large would say that we do not need this legislation
particularly because of the importance of competing with companies
from nations abroad.

I would like to now turn to David Boies to see if, as a proponent of the
legislation, he has a point of view as to either of the first two opening
statements.
MR. BOIES: I am, as Dan suggests, a proponent of the legislation. The
purpose of the legislation is to restrict unnecessary increases in concentration. The antitrust laws have traditionally focused on competition
within a particular market and concentration within a particular market
and not on so-called aggregate economic concentration or concentration
in the economy in general. But the economic, social, and political costs of
aggregate concentration may be as troubling-and even more
troubling-as the costs of concentration within a particular market. And
it is to the issues raised by such so-called aggregate concentration that
this legislation restricting large conglomerate mergers relates.

Large mergers inevitably reduce the number of independent businesses. This loss of diversity can limit the choices available to consumers.
It can also stunt the process of growth through innovation. As
conglomerates buy up more and more formerly independent companies, a new layer of business bureaucracy is imposed on the acquired
companies. This loss of diversity has economic effects-it reduces the
number of decision-making centers, imposes additional layers of intracorporate bureaucratic review, and impedes experimentation and
innovation. The principle of federalism that holds that innovation and
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experimentation are promoted by dispersion of power has its application to economic affairs as well. The loss of independence may also
adversely affect company-community and employer-employee relations

as absentee management becomes increasingly distant and isolated from
employee and community interests.

Economic concentration and the loss of diversity, particularly on the
kind of scale that mergers are taking place today, can have significant
social and political implications as well as economic, effects. One of the
trends that we have seen in Washington over the last five years has been
the increasing political activity of business political action committees
(PACs). There are about 800 active business PACs today. If the resources
and activities of those 800 business PACs were concentrated in 80 PACs,
or in 8, I think that the loss of diversity and the concentration of political
power that would result is something that is very troubling in any kind of
society, but particularly one like ours that prides itself on diversity and
prides itself on political, social, and economic democracy. Large
corporations, entirely aside from organized political activity, have
profound effects on our society-the tastes we acquire, the activities that
are encouraged or discouraged, the attitudes that are advertised or
attacked, the products and services that are offered or discontinued, and
the charities and public activities that are supported or starved for
funds. Only the most naive among us would suggest that in these areas
large corporations are guided and controlled wholly by the "invisible
hand" of the marketplace. We can argue about how much discretion
large corporations have in exercising their power-but there can be no
argument that they have some significant discretion. It is an article of
democratic faith that such discretionary power is best when it is
dispersed and most troubling when it is concentrated in a few handshowever benign.
Large mergers contribute significantly to the level of industrial
concentration. In 1975, there were fourteen mergers with a value in
excess of $100 million. In 1977 there were forty-one such mergers, in
1978 there were eighty such mergers, in 1979 there have already been
ninety such mergers and obviously the year isn't over yet. We can argue
over how much concentration is rising. Whether concentration is greater
today than it was five years ago or ten years ago, I think, depends to
some extent on what figures you look at. The one thing that is clear is
that the concentration is higher than it would have been in the absence
of the merger activity that has taken place.
Let me respond briefly to some of the issues Ed raises. First, I agree
that there are no mathematical equations that can tell us how much
concentration, how much loss of diversity, is too much. Much as we may
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dislike the fact, the fact is that such judgments-like the judgments in
favor of free speech and universal suffrage-are value judgments
rooted in social and political, as well as economic, values.
Second, Ed raises the concern as to how this legislation will affect the
ability of American corporations to compete in world markets. I think
that this is an appropriate inquiry-particularly today with our justifiable concern with balance-of-trade deficits and the growing dominance
of foreign competition. However, the focus of this legislation is large
conglomerate mergers-and restricting such mergers should not have
an adverse effect on the ability of American corporations to compete
either here or abroad. It seems to me that Ed's remarks about the need
to get American aircraft manufacturers to combine so that they can
compete with German companies, or about foreign nations encouraging
their companies to get together, like their aircraft manufacturers, or like
their computer companies, or like their steel companies, misses the mark
since this legislation essentially relates not to horizontal mergers, where
there are or can be substantial economies of scale and substantial
efficiencies, but to conglomerate mergers in which those efficiencies are
likely at the minimum to be much more attenuated and, at least in most
of the cases that we have looked at, from the standpoint of the
committee, either nonexistent or, at best, very, very speculative. It may
take, as Ed says, a large number of people to service elevators. It does
not, I think, help to increase the number of elevator servicemen that you
have to merge with a company that does not have any elevator
servicemen. You may want to have a lot of automobile dealerships. It
would not help Chrysler increase the economies of scale that it has in its
automobile manufacturing operation to merge it with a bakery or with a
conglomerate that was not involved in the automobile industry.
I think we have to face the issue of the extent to which, in the
horizontal area where there are substantial economies of scale possible,
we want to forgo what may be some of the benefits of competition for
some of the benefits of economies of scale. We do not have to face that
very difficult question in this area. In this area, we are talking about very,
very large mergers-mergers involving companies, each of which will
have most of the access to capital that is required.
The ability of firms to continue to merge where such mergers have
demonstrable benefits in enhancing competition or improving efficiencies is preserved by the affirmative defenses which permit even very
large mergers to take place if the acquiring company(a) can demonstrate that the merger will substantially enhance
competition;
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(b) can demonstrate that the merger will substantially increase
efficiencies; or
(c) divests itself of a portion of its existing business equal in sales and
assets to the business acquired.
Third, it has been suggested that restrictions on mergers will prevent
the replacement of inefficient management. I think that is an issue, and I
think that is a disadvantage with absolute limits on mergers. It is one of
the reasons why I favor some defenses to mergers, so that if you have got
a situation where you genuinely are going to have improved efficiencies,
you have an opportunity to prove it.
But in the main, I think the experience has been that the companies
that have been acquired have not been companies that have been poorly
run with poor operating ratios, or with inadequate earnings, but have
been basically efficiently managed companies. That is at least what
United Technologies always says when it is taking over a company, that
the management is very efficient and will be continued. And I think that
is true not only in United Technologies, but in most efficient and
well-run acquiring companies. They are looking not for inefficient
management, but for efficient management.
MR. KOLB: David would indicate, then, that the case for the conglomerate merger legislation is directed not so much at efficiency, such as Ed
Large described, but at something else indeed. I may say that one of the
things that has been stressed about this legislation is that it does have a
very strong political foundation, a social foundation; that it is aimed at a
broader scope than just economics.

At this point, I would like to turn to Tom Dieterich, who has been
working with our monograph and would, I think, be able to lend an
historical perspective to this that is especially important. Tom, please
feel free to say anything else you would like about the opening
statements that have been made so far.
MR. DIETERICH: I will not say anything about any of the three
preceding opening statements. But I do want to make one observation
related primarily to David's remarks.

I think it is historically accurate to say that heretofore the federal
antitrust laws have been concerned with conduct that has an anticompetitive consequence in an economic sense. The traditional "hard core"
antitrust offenses-such as price-fixing, horizontal business sharing
agreements, tying arrangements, and group boycotts-are all activities
that have been placed in the illegal per se category because the Supreme
Court has found that experience demonstrates that such activities have
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an immediate, direct and anticompetitive impact on the functioning of a
free market.
Where activity does not have that kind of impact, it has been placed
outside of the illegal per se area-and must be evaluated under the rule
of reason. Requirements contracts, exclusive dealing arrangements, and
vertical limitations upon the marketing activities of reselling customers
are so approached, and so, traditionally, has been merger activity.
Where a regulatory statute is not immediately concerned with the
impact of behavior upon the vitality of competition-and I here
specifically mention Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, a
violation of which does not turn upon any proof of injury to
competition-then that regulatory statute is not an antitrust law. And I
would submit that on that historical basis the pending conglomerate
merger legislation should not be characterized as an antitrust law at all.
MR. KOLB: My impression is that the proponents of the legislation
would probably agree with Tom's remarks up to a point. I do not know
whether they would accept the notion that the proposed legislation
should not be called an antitrust law at all. But it is my impression, as I
said a moment ago, that there is a political and social commitment
behind the legislation, a factor which we should look at very hard.

With that in mind, I would like to turn to Sandy Pfunder, who is from
the FTC. And let me add one further thing which I would like Sandy to
speak to. It has been said in a number of the speeches advocating the
legislation that the reason the antitrust enforcement agencies have
proposed this legislation is that they have begun to recognize that
beyond a point they cannot win lawsuits opposing conglomerate
mergers. I think that it would be well if Sandy, in addition to possibly
commenting on the political and social foundations of this legislation,
would also speak to that experience in the antitrust enforcement
agencies.
MR. PFUNDER: One of the fascinating things about this subject is that
you see in the first twenty or twenty-five minutes here how many people
can talk about how many different aspects there are to this thing without
ever necessarily crossing swords except with respect to very basic
perspectives.

Any debate about the conglomerate merger legislation proposals
really does presume that you start by asking very basic questions about
perspective. I guess I would agree with Tom Dieterich that whether or
not these proposals are an antitrust concept depends at least upon how
you define your terms and on whether you treat the problem as
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semantic. I think of these as antitrust issues in the sense that they start
from a premise of a role of economic units in the economy, but more
broadly in the society. Antitrust law has traditionally placed certain
kinds of limits upon the activities of those units with reference to the way
in which they interact in specific markets and through the specific
medium of competition.
I think the hallmark of the conglomerate merger is that it has impacts
on many different markets and that it does not necessarily have an
adverse impact on competition in any of those markets. If you are
inclined to a broad definition of the concept of antitrust, the conglomerate merger legislation proposals have in common an effort to define
certain kinds of restrictions on the activities of economic units, usually
corporations, in the economy and in the society as a whole. The
proposals purport to state certain kinds of limits which different parties
feel are appropriate.
I think that is a roundabout and maybe overly abstract way of saying
that I think the underlying judgment in the debate about the attractiveness of various conglomerate merger proposals is ultimately a political
judgment about the appropriate level of government intervention. That
intervention is stated in terms of competition and markets, but has
traditionally had a larger purpose. Maybe defined slightly differently, at
issue is the appropriate role for conglomerate mergers among business
units, functioning as they do in their separate markets, and specifically
for the appropriateness of growth by merger.
The ability of the antitrust agencies to win lawsuits is, I think, only a
small piece of that puzzle. It is a piece which has traditionally aimed, a's
has conventional antitrust rubric, at impact on competition in specific
markets. My own belief is that most conglomerate mergers tested in
those terms are undoubtedly legal under the antitrust laws, as they exist
today. Whether they should be legal and by what rules that should be
tested are essentially what the conglomerate merger legislation proposals are all about.
I think it is fair to emphasize something that David Boies raised. These
legislation proposals are, in terms of what they would do and what they
would reach, very limited and very conservative. The underlying
concepts tend to get away from you very quickly, however, and tend to
raise ultimate questions before the more limited questions to which they
are addressed are necessarily resolved.
The conglomerate merger legislation proposals of the Judiciary
Committee and of the Antitrust Division and of the Federal Trade
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Commission all purport to deal primarily with a concept of growth by
merger-narrower than that, growth by large firms through conglomerate merger-narrower even than that, growth by such firms through
larger mergers, specifically mergers of over $100 million size. Now, that
is the immediate issue. Whether these proposals are the best way to get at
the issue is fair game for discussion.
I think you can detect, just from what has been said so far, that one of
the fascinating things about this subject is that the underlying factual
premises are often perceived very differently. Mr. Large says we have to
grow; we have to grow by merger; we have to diversify in this fashion to
be strong competitively. The antitrust agencies jump up and down and
say, "No, you do not." And the issue may ultimately turn on whichever
premise is factually the more accurate.
It is fair to say that the empirical evidence on any of these issues is
thin. That is why I think people get nervous about the kinds of political
judgments that may or may not be appropriate to make, in the absence
of more empirical evidence. I think that is essentially where the debate
centers.
MR. KOLB:

Sandy, thank you very much.

If we have the debate focused-and I think Sandy focused it very
well-I think it might be time to ask some pointed questions. Let me just
suggest a little background before I put this question to David Boies.
If, in fact, the government agencies are not able after a point to prove
that there is economically an anticompetitive impact from a particular
merger, and if the United States government representatives here would
consider that the case is one where there is not a great deal of empirical
evidence, where it might very well be very thin, is there in fact any
economic justification for the legislation, or is the legislation primarily,
almost exclusively, based on social and political problems? David?
MR. BoIEs: I think the answer to that depends entirely on what you
mean by economic considerations. If by economic considerations, you
mean traditional antitrust considerations, that is, the state of competition in a particular market, then I think the answer is that certainly the
primary justification for the legislation does not relate to antitrust
economic considerations of that nature. There are some traditional
antitrust justifications for the bill that go to entrenchment of large firms,
the creation of barriers to entry, the elimination of potential competition, and encouragement of reciprocal dealing.

On the other hand, I think that those considerations, while significant,
do not represent the primary thrust of the legislation. I think one of the
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reasons they are relevant is that, while those kinds of proof are available
to antitrust enforcement agencies under existing law, the proof of those
circumstances, the implementation of those theories, is something that is
very time-consuming, very expensive, and very uncertain.
And so even from the standpoint of some of these more traditional
antitrust-type justifications for the legislation, there is some desirability
in attempting to formulate a more predictable test that will focus on the
kinds of situations where those antitrust problems, in the traditional
sense, are most likely to occur.
Having said that, I think that is a relatively small part of the
foundation for the legislation. And I think that if that were all we were
talking about, we probably would not have the legislation, or at least we
would not have the legislation with the same kind of support that it has.
Unique among major pieces of legislation that I am aware of in
Congress, this is legislation that is supported by the National Federation
of Independent Businesses, the largest organization of small and
medium-sized businesses in the country, representing some 600,000
businesses, and the AFL-CIO, as well as by virtually every organized
consumer group.
And I think the reason that you see this kind of support, with almost
the sole opposition coming from very large corporations in the United
States, is the social, economic, and political value judgments that are the
foundation of this legislation. Those economic value judgments are
broader than conventional antitrust concerns and relate, for example, to
the relationships between a large company and its employees. Now, we
are told that the employees of Otis have never been better off, from the
viewpoint of United Technologies management, and that may be so.
And I certainly would not say that it is impossible for worker relationships sometimes to improve from mergers.
Nevertheless, looking at employment relationships from the standpoint of the employees, what you find is that the employee organizations
are universally opposed to these mergers because they feel that they
create difficulty for them to deal with management, they lengthen the
distance of management from the labor organizations, they make it a
more rigid relationship, more difficult for them to establish a decent
working relationship.
Now, that may or may not be accurate, and I suspect probably, as is the
case in most situations, labor and management's views may differ on it.
But where you have that perception on the part of labor organizations,
where you have the kind of dissatisfaction that is evident from the
AFL-CIO's positions and the positions of its member organizations, you
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see a deterioration, at least in a number of cases, in labor-management
relations. And that may be an economic problem, or it may be a social
problem, or it may be some combination of them. Certainly it is
economic in the sense that it relates to economic relationships and can
have an effect upon the economic efficiency of the company. Certainly it
has social implications as well.
Another kind of partly economic and partly social relationship is the
relationship of the large conglomerate with its suppliers. And again we
hear that, from the viewpoint of United Technologies, the suppliers of
the merged corporation could not be happier. On the other hand, when
those suppliers, largely small- and medium-sized businesses, express
their own point of view, it is a point of view that says, as the National
Federation of Independent Businesses has put it, that large conglomerate mergers severely interfere with what the suppliers view as their
economic relationships with the companies they are dealing with.
Is that an economic consideration? Yes. Is it a social consideration?
Yes. Is it a traditional narrow antitrust economic issue? Probably not.
Now, there are a lot of those kinds of considerations that are partly
social and political in nature and partly economic.
MR. KOLB: I think it would be very appropriate, since we heard so
much about United Technologies' viewpoint from a different angle, if we
turn next to Ed Large to see if he has any rebuttal.
MR. LARGE: I would like to rebut, if I could, one of the first things that
Dave said, back in his first statement, when he seemed to assume that
coriglomerate mergers never have any economies because, by definition, the merging companies are in different markets. The economies
that we are concerned about in our business-and maybe I ought to
give a little background of United Technologies. We are about 35 to 40
percent foreign right now. We see well over half of our growth in the
future occurring in the foreign market, and we are estimating our
foreign business will be 50 percent of our total in the next five to six
years.

Our main market, just to be very specific, is jet engines. When we
started our diversification program in 1973-and we were aware of this
at the time-our major jet engine competitor was some six to seven times
bigger than we were. Our number two and three competitors were the
British and French governments, respectively. You just plain do not
compete against that kind of muscle with a small company.
It may very well be that when I acquire an elevator company, it is not
going to make better jet engines for me. But it is going to give me some
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more muscle so I can stay in there with my bigger competition. That is
exactly what I think it has done for us.
The world is becoming smaller. United Technologies is not atypical.
Maybe our market shares are a little higher than some. But we live in a
truly international world now. We find Rolls Royce, one of our British
competitors owned by the British government, coming in with plans now
to manufacture in the United States. The Japanese are coming in and
buying companies, such as Motorola's television business. And I suspect
you will find they will buy up a lot more in the future.
As I mentioned earlier, one Japanese company, the Mitsubishi Group,
has sales of $44 billion! You just plain cannot compete against $44 billion
in muscle with a "Mom-and-Pop" grocery store. And, if the big foreign
companies are going to start throwing their muscle around, you are
going to have to be big just to stay with them.
That is the economic reality that I am worried about. That is the
economic reality that I think this legislation just totally ignores.
MR. KOLB: I think we really are focusing the issue because we are now
quite some distance from the traditional concepts of the Clayton Act,
Section 7, and we are talking about different social and economic
viewpoints. Let me ask at this point, if I may, for the comment of our two
purportedly objective observers, Mr. Dieterich and Professor Bauer, to
see what they think about the competing arguments that have already
been put forth and any other point they may have on the issue, starting
with Professor Bauer.
PROFESSOR BAUER: Let me first say that I agree with Tom that most of
the issues are political and social. But I am not prepared to say that there
are not some very important possible economic consequences to large
mergers, to conglomerate mergers, of even a very traditional Section 7
nature, that is, reasonable probability of a substantial lessening of
competition.

The three traditional approaches that have been used under Section 7
for conglomerate mergers, the potential entrant doctrine, entrenchment, and reciprocity, have gotten a very rough ride from the Supreme
Court and then lower courts in recent years. But in my view, there is a
substantial argument for saying that those kinds of mergers do have
some very serious economic consequences, and these doctrines ought
not be dismissed.
The one case that I think gives a very good example of the kinds of
adverse economic consequences from conglomerate merger is the
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Procter & Gamble (P&G)-Clorox merger, where you had the largest
advertiser in the United States acquiring a company, Clorox, which was
the largest bleach manufacturer in the United States, with about 50
percent of the market in a highly oligopolistic industry. The two largest
companies had almost 65 percent of the market. In my recollection,
P&G's advertising budget was more than twice Clorox's total annual
sales. And it seems to me those are the kinds of product-extension
mergers, conglomerate mergers, which can be attacked under very
traditional antitrust theories. And you do not haveto rely on political
consequences or social consequences as well.

The second point I would make is one that Sandy Pfunder alluded to.
Although antitrust clearly must be recognized to have broader functions
than simply preservation of small units or simply preservation of
competition for itself, in my view that, too, is an extremely important
goal.
Historically antitrust has been designed to achieve that goal, because if
we did not do it, we would have to do the same thing in another way.
And the antitrust laws are designed to preserve the general features of
our economy with minimal government regulation. It is a marvelous
system.
self-policing
Ed Large was saying earlier that United Technologies forbears from
making acquisitions which they know are likely to run into government
challenge. It seems to me that is one of the valuable features of our
antitrust laws, that there is at least some general idea of what is and what
is not unlawful, so that the government does not need to interfere.
The alternative to doing that is either to have some socialism, which I
think all of us would shy away from, or at least have government
agencies deciding what the price of goods will be and who will sell to
whom. Antitrust is designed to avoid those alternatives. It seems to me,
although one can call that political and social, that this does have
extremely important economic components.
The third point I wanted to raise was, I do not know how happy the
Otis employees are with United Technologies' acquisition of Otis. I infer
that they are singing the company's song. And I have no reason to doubt
that. On the other hand, one can point to conglomerate acquisitions
which do not have those kinds of happy consequences. I think of one in
my hometown of South Bend, Indiana. There was a medium-sized
company called Associates Finance, which was one of the largest
2

FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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employers in South Bend, certainly the largest white-collar employer,
with something on the order of 1,000 employees. It was acquired by a
small, little operation called Gulf and Western. And within one year of
its acquisition by Gulf and Western, Associates' headquarters in South
Bend was closed up and it was moved to Dallas. Well, let me say that
people who had made homes in South Bend may not have been that
happy about that acquisition. Whether that is good or bad, one has to
recognize that those are among the consequences of conglomerate
acquisitions.
You do not have to be in favor only of things bucolic, as Justice
Douglas was in the Falstaff case,3 where he sang the praises of Goldendale, Washington. You do not have to go quite that far to recognize that
there are some extremely important consequences of conglomerate
mergers which are perhaps not of a strictly economic nature, but that
are also not trivial.
The last thing I would like to suggest is that maybe what we are asking
is on whom should the burden of proof be. It was the last question I
raised in my preliminary statement, but I would like to make the point
again. Ed Large told us how Otis was helped by being acquired by
United Technologies, that Otis was extremely profitable last year. I am
not sure whether that was the result of Otis's qualifications, Otis's own
good management to begin with, or whether it was something that UT's
financial muscle helped with. I am not sure I understand why having
Otis Elevator helps one sell jet engines in competition with Rolls Royce. I
hear the assertion, but, excuse me, I am not persuaded. It seems to me
what we are talking about, then, is the burden of proof.
One can, on the one hand, argue that it does help, and then, on the
other hand, argue that it does not. We admit that this is not the kind of
thing which is going to be subject to empirical proof. On whom should
the burden of proof be? One can make the judgment, as I have, that
these kinds of acquisitions are likely to have very serious kinds of
consequences. And I do not want to wait until twenty years from now to
see that I turned out to be right.
MR. KOLB: Let me just say before passing the microphone to Tom that
the proposed legislation would leave in place the existing antitrust
legislation. So if there were genuine economic problems, competitive
problems, with respect to a particular acquisition-let's say it created a
genuine potential competition problem-it could still be barred under

'United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 543 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).

PANEL DISCUSSION

1659

the traditional legislation. So the question we are asking is, do we go
further, do we bar mergers in areas and in situations where you could
not prove that.
Now, Tom?
guess, Joe, I shall have to refer back to your
opening statement for just a moment. Not being an economist, I cannot
go further than regurgitate what has been told to me by others. But I
observe that questions such as whether the average size of a domestic
company is increasing or decreasing (after an appropriate adjustment
for inflation), whether there is increased concentration in American
industry in a 4-firm, 8-firm, or other concentration ratio sense, and
whether there is increased concentration in gross in the sense of
aggregate sales or assets of a specified number of the largest domestic
corporations (100, 200, 500, or 1,000) are questions the answer to which
will vary depending on the identity of the person responding. You will
get answers indicating everything from significantly decreased concentration to significantly increased concentration. And I just do not think
there is any empirical data clearly establishing the immutable truth of
any answer to any such question.
MR. DIETERICH: I

The existence or nonexistence of a trend toward concentration in the
economy of the United States is, I think, fairly debatable. I think we must
assume that there is a case that can be made on either side of that
argument.
Also fairly debatable is the existence of any relationship between the
degree of concentration existing in any particular industry and the
vitality of competition in that industry. If a case can be made for the
proposition that concentration is increasing, that does not-at least in
my view--establish the need for remedial legislation absent establishment of the further and different proposition that increased concentration is, in and of itself, anticompetitive.
Which leads me to my second point. Under the antitrust laws as they
exist today, the courts hav developed and applied a number of theories
under which a conglomerate merger can be condemned if the facts of
the particular case demonstrate a reasonable probability that that
merger will have anticompetitive consequences. The actual potential
entrant doctrine is such a theory. The perceived potential entrant
'
doctrine is another-and that theory was applied in FordlAutolite. The
' United

States v. Ford Motor Co., 197 1-1 Trade Cas.

405 U.S. 562 (1977).

73,445 (E.D. Mich. 1970), affd

1660

EMERGING ISSUES IN MERGER ENFORCEMENT STANDARDS

entrenchment theory, applied in cases such as Reynolds Metals-Arrow5 and
P&G-Clorox,' is a third. And the reciprocity theory, applied in Consolidated Foods,7 is another.
It is true, as David has observed, that in many instances-particularly
in the last three, four, or five years-antitrust enforcement authorities
have lost conglomerate merger cases that they have filed. But I question
whether it is proper to conclude from that fact that we need new
legislation to prohibit transactions of a kind that have been challenged
unsuccessfully by the antitrust enforcement authorities. It seems to me
that you can make the argument that those cases have been correctly
decided-and that there is no reason to condemn a conglomerate
merger unless there is a demonstrable and reasonable probability that
that merger will have an anticompetitive effect in light of its particular
facts.
I think David conceded that much. As I heard him, he has no desire to
procure a new law that would simply give antitrust enforcement
authorities another ground on which to win cases that they could already
win under existing law. Consequently, the real issue seems to me to be
whether we want or need a federal law that, absent special pleading,
would preclude a company from making an acquisition if it would
thereafter have more than a foreordained total of sales or assets.
Anticompetitive effects--or the absence thereof-would be irrelevant.
That is why I said the first time around that I think this is really a
political and sociological debate, rather than one involving traditional
antitrust considerations.
From my own personal standpoint, I oppose that kind of legislation. I
do not think that the government, in exercising the power that it has had
to run industries like the railroads, the airlines, and the shipping
companies, has demonstrated that it is better able to determine what an
industry should look like and how it should be run than private industry.
I don't trust government to determine maximum size, and I don't trust
government's ability to determine what should be "peeled off' when
an acquisition would take a company over some foreordained maximum size.
Ed Large has pointed out-very properly in my view-that domestic
industry today is competing in international markets. The AFL-CIO and
' Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
' FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cas.
1978).

62,063 (E.D. Pa.
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the Association of Independent Businessmen, about whose support of
the concept of pending legislation we have already heard, may well
prefer a return to the kind of industry structure we had in the 1830s.
They also support continued existence of the Robinson-Patman Act, in
unamended form. If that is the economic structure that comports with
one's political and sociological predilections-I respect the predilections.
But that is not the economic structure in which domestic industry is
today attempting to compete, on an international basis.
MR. KOLB: I think you can all see now that I am the only objective
one. During Tom's account, Sandy Pfunder was gnashing his teeth over
here and leaned over to me and said, "Are you going to call on me?"
And I said I would. Sandy?

I thought I was going to be with Tom right up to the
point at which he said what he thought the real question was. I come out
a little differently as to what I think the real question is.
MR. PFUNDER:

I do not see these legislative proposals as focused primarily on the
question of whether an absolute limit to the size of one or all American
corporations should be legislated. I think the legislation is aimed at
something different and has a different underlying premise. It is
essentially that, to the extent that firms have and create additional
capital, there is a preference as to how that capital might be employed,
or at least a preference as to how it ought not be employed.
Growth by merger is obviously one of the things that corporations can,
and frequently do, do with their retained earnings. There are other
alternatives. Some of those other alternatives have costs which may
explain why they are relatively less popular. But I think the issue here is
not an optimal size or a maximum size for corporations, but rather
whether acquisition is an appropriate use of corporate resourcesand specifically acquisitions by very large companies of very large companies.
Now, having said that, I doubt that I have won many converts. Let me
state as simply as I can what I think the basic case is for the legislation.
You can draw your own conclusions, and I will not tell you what mine
are. I think the underlying premise is that the economics, at least the
microeconomics, and the market-by-market, maybe industry-by-industry, economics, are awash. Now, I hear Ed Large saying, it ain't so,
and to the extent he is right, he has focused on one very important
aspect of the debate. If United Technologies is in fact strengthened in its
ability to make and market aircraft engines worldwide by reason of its
acquisition of Otis, that fact, and particularly the underlying factual
evidence that supports it, is very important to this debate, because the
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underlying premise of the legislation is that Otis does not need United
Technologies and United Technologies does not need Otis. Or maybe I
would be more comfortable leaving it in the abstract, to say that, on
balance, the economic evidence supporting the efficiencies or the better
performance derived from large conglomerate mergers just is not there.
You can still debate whether the evidence ought to be brought forward
by the proponents of legislation that would limit growth by conglomerate merger, or whether the proponents of large mergers should bring
that evidence forward in order to justify being able to make large
acquisitions.
My initial point was that this is a political choice. It is not an antitrust
choice; it is not an economic choice. But that is where the debate
essentially focuses.
Not even in the broadest macroeconomic sense do we, in my view, get
very far in trying to demonstrate the importance of conglomerate
merger limitations. I do not think the aggregate concentration figures
are very persuasive one way or the other, and they certainly do not
support a major change in the way in which the statutes of the United
States view the process of conglomerate mergers, at least in my view.
On the other hand, there are three kinds of problems, all of which
have the same thing in common. One is the growth of discretionary
economic power in the perhaps simplistic sense that says that when two
large firms merge, their economic resources are combined. And I hear a
bit of Ed Large's descriptions as at least fitting that kind of mold.
Second, in the political arena, to the extent that any two corporations
have any kind of political power, large, small, or in-between, the
assumption underlying the legislation is that, all things being equal,
when two firms merge, they will aggregate whatever political power they
separately possessed.
Finally, the social consequences of mergers tend, again all things
being equal, to become that much larger when the decisions that have
social consequences of any kind are made by fewer and fewer parties.
All of this is simply another way of saying that the conglomerate
merger legislation is directed at very large, perhaps grossly oversimplified, notions of long-range trends that result from the growth of
aggregate concentration and from the growth of economic and political
power through merger. And one can debate forever how soon one takes
a position on that kind of issue, what kind of evidence can be mustered
pro and con, what kind of demonstration one must make before
legislation is appropriate. That all is fair game. And I think the
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proposals that are before Congress at this point will at least have the
primary benefit of focusing a debate which I think Senator Hart had
hoped to begin in a little different way in his original proposals of the
Industrial Reorganization Act. They are the same basic underlying
issues and many of the same basic theories, but I think directed in a
much more conservative way.
MR. KOLB: Sandy, thank you.
Before we move on to another part of this subject, I think it might be
well for me to add a perspective which is not my own, but is something
that appears in the speeches and the other literature that supports this
legislation. It has not come out so far in our discussion, I think, in any
prominent way, because it is possible that these spokesmen for the
legislation do not avow it. But you should know about it.
There are speeches which indicate that one reason to pass this
legislation is that the power of big business in Washington, through its
lobbyists, through the Business Roundtable, and so forth, has become so
immense that it is particularly important to limit firm size. It is stressed
in a sophisticated argument that diversity of business viewpoint is
limited if you combine business leaders into one giant corporation,
where there used to be four or five.
That is another point of view. It is more truly a political reason for this
legislation. I think one could say on the other side that if one is going to
pass legislation to limit the political power of a particular group, one
could easily do that for labor unions, the Republican Party, the
Democratic Party, and so forth. And I think one does have to see this as
one of the underpinnings of the legislation, though I note that a good
many proponents do not advocate that as the reason. But it is there and
you should know about it.
Let me move to the next very important question, and that is if this
legislation is to be enacted, what form exactly should it take? You recall I
started by reading to you sohne of the lists of the types of defenses that
had been advocated. These are defenses to the basic initial finding that
the merger is over the threshold amount, whatever it is. You recall that
there were defenses such as showing that the preponderant effect will be
beneficial, that there will be efficiencies that would stem from the
merger that would be more important than the anticompetitive effects.
Another approach is what has been called the cap and spin-off
approach.
These are important subjects in the debate. What I would like to do is
spend our last bit of time touching upon those. And the way I would like
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to do it is to start with the advocates of the two most significant
approaches, the preponderant evidence efficiencies approach and the
cap and spin-off. I think David Boies could speak to the first and Sandy
Pfunder to the second. And then I think the others on the panel could
respond.
MR. BOLES: In the legislation that the Judiciary Committee and
Senator Kennedy has introduced, as I think you know, we have a
combination of those defenses. The cap and spin-off defense is really, I
think, largely originated by the Federal Trade Commission in its present
form. The pro-efficiencies and pro-competitive defense is largely
originated by the Antitrust Division. And in a typical spirit of legislative
compromise, we have adopted all three of them.

As this legislation progresses, the nature and extent of what affirmative defenses, if any, may be appropriate will be given much scrutiny. I
think there are sound arguments for and against all of those approaches. I think obviously the argument against having these defenses is that if
conglomerate mergers and the growth of concentration really are a
problem, then perhaps we ought to just prohibit at least very large
mergers altogether.
I think the other side, which we have found more persuasive, is that
there probably are mergers in which the advantages outweigh the
problems associated with them, and you ought to give the proponents of
that merger an opportunity to come in and prove that.
The reason for including the cap and spin-off approach is that in a
number of cases it may be very difficult to prov e that a merger actually
will enhance competition or will'increase efficiency, but the management of the corporation may believe that very strongly and may believe
this is a very desirable merger. And so the cap and spin-off approach,
which really says, as incorporated in our'bill, if you want to make a
merger that you cannot justify externally, but you think is important for
you to do, you have to spin off a comparable, sized portion of your
business, so that at least you have not used this assertion, this unproven
assertion, as a means to grow through merger.
That all underlies what I think is the general philosophy of the
legislation, which is not directed at size per se and is not even directed at
mergers per se, but is directed at very large mergers that, based on the
economic and other evidence available, are not justified. That does not
mean that there are not problems with size unassociated with conglomerate mergers, but generally that the advantages, social and economic, to
permitting firms to continue to grow where that growth is as a result of
more efficient operation in the market or will bring about provable
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efficiencies or enhancement in competition, outweigh any of those
problems.
Let me just reply to a couple of things that Tom said, if I could spend
60 seconds on that.
MR.

KOLB:

He was gnashing his teeth, too.

MR. BOlES: The question was raised as to whether or not there really
was an increase in concentration; I think the statistics show that there has
been, particularly in manufacturing, but I am not sure that is the
relevant inquiry. In 1975, there were fourteen mergers in excess of $100
million. In 1977, there were forty such mergers. In 1978, there were
eighty mergers over $100 million. Thus far in 1979, there have already
been ninety such mergers.

What is clear is that there is a significant increase in the number of
very large mergers, and concentration is higher as a result of those
mergers than it would otherwise have been. Whether it is increasing, as
most economists believe, or decreasing, as some people believe, or about
the same, as a lot of people believe, I do not know and I do not think is
critical.
What I think is relevant to the concentration issue is that there is
clearly more concentration than there would have been without the very
large 4iergers.
In terms of whether we want to have the government run the shipping
industry or the airline industry, I do not think we do. I think that is one
of the reasons for this kind of legislation. I also think that is one of the
reasons why the same person who introduced this legislation was also the
person who introduced in Congress the airline deregulation act. I do not
think this society will tolerate government-sized businesses that are not
justified in terms of efficiencies. We are either going to regulate them,
like we tried to do with the Federal Maritime Commission, the CAB, or
maybe with the Robinson-Patman Act, or we are going to have them at a
size that is not larger than the size that they can justify.
I think the right way to posit the question is: are we going to keep
business at a size at which it can operate independently of the
government, or are we going to let it grow to such a size that the forces
that brought us to the Federal Maritime Commission, the CAB, and the
Robinson-Patman Act are going to say that we have let it get that big and
now we are going to regulate it?
MR. KOLB: I would like Sandy to comment on the cap and spin-off
approach, which has been the principal suggestion of the Federal Trade
Commission as a way to handle this type of legislation.
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MR. PFUNDER: I think the primary reason underlying the cap and
spin-off proposal is the same basic reasoning that underlies the suggestion that it is appropriate to have defenses in any of the proposed
conglomerate merger bills for something roughly equated with efficiency and something separate, roughly equated with a preponderant
pro-competitive impact. Nobody, particularly not the Federal Trade
Commission, has any interest in reaching out to forbid either the
pro-competitive mergers or the efficiency-enhancing mergers under any
of these proposals. The issue is: how do you deal with those kinds of
issues, and how do you create a workable 0efense?

We put forward the cap and spin-off proposal in an effort to eliminate
these issues from litigation.
The cap and spin-off proposal is designed to permit companies to
make large acquisitions, providing they are willing to spin off something
equally large, and thereby choose between what they would acquire and
what they would spin off, on whatever basis is important to them. Now,
that may be a basis that looks primarily to efficiencies. It may look
primarily to a pro-competitive impact, keeping in mind that the basic
antitrust strictures would remain in place. It can look to anything that
corporate management feels is relevant.
The cap and spin-off is designed to say that those features of a larger
corporate acquisition are most appropriately left to corporate managers,
rather than brought into courtrooms where they are litigated before
judges and involve lawyers and evidence and proof. They are horrendous issues.
The possibility of combining a cap and spin-off with separate defenses
for efficiency or predominant pro-competitive impact is, I think, a
different kind of concept. It leaves the cap and spin-off as a safety valve,
as an alternative to litigating some very difficult issues.
I do not have any problem with that, but it is a different approach. It
makes fair game the potential trial of issues on which, as an antitrust
lawyer, would make me shudder, if you think about the kinds of
efficiencies, the kinds of contexts in which efficiency might be relevant,
and the ways in which you might measure efficiencies.
I think from a practical standpoint, the person who has the burden of
proof on those issues probably loses. And one advantage, in our view, to
the cap and spin-off is that not only do you not have to decide how to
litigate those issues, you do not necessarily have to decide who wins them
or loses them by specifying who has the burden of proof. You make
those issues irrelevant to the extent you can. And you simply lay down
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broader ground rules which permit acquisition to take place if corporate
management feels that, on balance, for those reasons or any other
reasons, they are better off making an acquisition and doing a spin-off of
something of comparable size.
MR. KOLB: Let me ask Tom Dieterich what he thinks of the various
competing types of approach that have been suggested.
MR. DIETERICH: From the standpoint of simplifying antitrust litigation, the cap and spin-off approach is the only one that results in
simplifying the trial of an antitrust merger case. Assuming for the
moment that there will be some such legislation, one very real problem
that I envisage with the cap and spin-off approach is that I cannot see
how your cap can be a constant cap. We have an economy that, in real
terms, has been inflating at somewhere between 10 and 15 percent a
year for the last five years.

I think the fact is that to have any meaningful cap, you are going to
have to have an escalating cap. How do you escalate it? The problem
boggles my imagination. I do not know how to solve it. I think it is
compounded by the fact that real growth in different industries is not
going on at the same level. The depreciation of assets of different
industries is not going on at the same level. The electronics industry has
far more real growth-I am speaking very broadly on the basis of
newspaper clippings-but is it really fair to apply the same cap and
spin-off rule to a $2 billion electronics company that you apply to a steel
producer?
I agree completely with Sandy that the ultimate result of enacting an
efficiencies defense means that the person who has the burden of proof
loses. And, again, I think I would revert to the fact that the enactment of
such a law would reflect far more by way of a political and sociological
determination as to what the structure of American industry should be
than it reflects any empirically demonstrated threat to the competitiveness of the structure of the American economy.
MR. KOLB:

Professor Bauer?

PROFESSOR BAUER: I will try to keep this brief. My view is that among
those two defenses-and I think a defense is important-the efficiencies
defense is preferable to the cap and spin-off approach. The two
advantages that I see to the cap and spin-off approach are, first of all, it
is far more consistent with the noneconomic, that is, the political and
social, arguments that we have been making. If conglomerate growth is
bad, then conglomerate growth is bad regardless of whether it does or
does not have economic efficiencies, and therefore the cap and spin-off
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approach, while allowing an efficient acquisition, requires that there be a
trade-off for it. The other advantage is one that seems to me fundamental, that is, the judicial management problem. It is a fairly straightforward kind of thing, without involving the courts in enormous and often
imponderable problems.
But the disadvantages that I see are two as well, and, in my view, they
outweigh the advantages. One is that it allows the company, to be a little
pejorative, to sell off its dogs. You acquire a healthy company, and in
order to do that, you sell off your weakest link. And even if it does not do
that, if our assertion is that the big companies are far better able to
survive than the small ones, I think you have very, very real problems of
whether a spun-off small independent will be able to survive.
I want just thirty seconds' worth of response to Tom Dieterich's
observation that what we are trying to do-or what this legislation is
trying to do-is place an absolute size on the growth of companies. I
think that is not true, for the reason that it certainly does not prohibit
alternative forms of growth, either internal expansion or, as I read the
bill, the toehold defense, that is, taking a small company and expanding
that small company into a viable competitor. What it does is say that a
large acquisitive corporation ought not to grow by acquiring a large
ongoing enterprise and making that a part of its umbrella.
MR. KOLB: I will complete the sequence with one more speaker on
this issue and then one more general question. I would like to turn to Ed
Large first of all for a comment on the cap and spin-off versus
efficiencies defense, and then I want to ask one general question about.
foreign commerce.
MR. LARGE: If I could turn the question a little bit, I would like to talk
about the structure of the legislation. I think it ought to be round and no
larger than the nearest trash can.

Just one comment on this suggestion that has come up several times
that we are talking about very limited legislation. We all seem to agree
that we have a political issue here. And I do not see how you make a
differentiation, on a political basis, between growth through internal
growth or growth through acquisition. If you do not like it politically,
you do not like it. And this is just the first step. We might as well call a
spade a spade.
MR. KOLB: One remaining issue that is of some considerable importance is the impact this legislation might have on acquisitions by
companies overseas. There was, of course, the initial proposal that the
company overseas be treated just like the American company in terms of
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the threshold test and defense and so forth. That could tend to produce
foreign relations problems. Conversely, if you give a foreign corporation an advantage by structuring a test that helps it, there are corporations, possibly even United Technologies, that might suggest that is not
fair. This does present a serious policy question if the legislation is to be
passed. And I would like to ask all of the speakers to comment on that
briefly. I am going to start with Ed Large.
MR. LARGE: Again, I do not mean to avoid the question, but
regardless of whether the law literally applies to foreign trade or foreign
companies, we cannot as a practical matter export it. We just plain
cannot. Mitsubishi is not going to reduce its $44 billion size no matter
what we do. The same thing will happen with the German companies,
with the French companies, and with the British companies. They are
going to laugh all the way to the bank if we do this sort of thing, if we
reduce ourselves to impotence through these artificial size barriers.
MR. KOLB:

David Boies?

MR. Bols: The way the legislation is presently drafted, it would
apply to any acquisition where one party to a merger meets the
jurisdictional amount requirements in the United States and the other
company meets such requirements on a world-wide basis. So if you had
an acquisition of, for example, American Motors or United Technologies or the Otis Elevator Company by Mitsubishi or any of the other
large foreign companies, that would be covered.

I agree that there are some potential foreign policy considerations.
From our standpoint, at least at the present time, we tentatively feel that
as long as what we are regulating is the acquisition of American
corporations, we have a pretty easily defensible right to regulate that,
regardless of the national source of the acquiring company. This is,
however, an area that raises very complex issues and needs further
thought.
Let me just ask you, what would happen if the acquisition
of the American corporatidn were incidental to an acquisition overseas.
The body of the acquisition is primarily in Europe, let's say, but a small
part of it is in the United States.
MR. KOLB:

MR. BOIES: If the assets or sales in the United States exceeded the
jurisdictional amount limits, then that portion of it would be covered.
Now, obviously, we cannot preclude an acquisition outside of the United
States, or if we can, we are not going to do that. But if the merger or the
acquisition is of a company both in and outside the United States and in
the United States it is above the jurisdictional amount, that would be
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covered. And the only way to solve that would be to spin off the
American portion of the acquisition.
MR. KOLB:

Let me ask Professor Bauer, do you have any comments

on this?
Really, very limited. I appreciate Ed Large's
argument. I agree that one of the fundamental problems with this entire
legislation is that the United States is no longer insular, if we ever were.
It is extremely important, as the dollar gets weaker and we have oil
problems, and that entire litany, that American companies not have an
additional burden of competing internationally.
PROFESSOR

BAUER:

However, at least with respect to the particular question that you have
raised, there is a fair amount of congruence. It is true that we are not
going to be able to control the expansion of Mitsibishi or British or
French or Italian companies. However, the statute would also not do
anything to internal growth of American companies. What we are saying
is that under certain circumstances, foreign companies ought not to be
acquiring American companies. That is a simple congruence. If American companies are going to make those large acquisitions abroad, they
similarly are not covered by this proposal. I see the political concernsthat foreign countries are not going to like it-but I do not see quite as
clearly the alleged economic problems.
MR. KOLB: Let me pass the microphone to Sandy Pfunder. And let
me just embellish this a little bit by asking him to comment on whether
or not this approach could lead to retaliation by foreign countries who
view the legislation as restrictive and, in that way, cut down on free
trade.
MR. PFUNDER: Yes. I suppose it could. And I think these kinds of
issues are probably the most difficult part of the attempt to construct a
piece of proposed legislation that would do what any of the conglomerate merger legislation proposals would do. I think the problem is
solvable, because I think the issue is the defensible reach of the
jurisdiction of U.S. law with respect to the impact of conglomerate
mergers on the economic, political, and social environment within the
United States. While the mechanics are potentially very difficult to
construct and not without considerable pitfalls, I think the adverse
impacts in the foreign environment can probably be minimized. And I
think something can probably be put together that will not disrupt the
whole scheme of things.

MR. KOLB:

Now for an objective wrap-up, Tom Dieterich.
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MR. DIETERICH: I am not sure that this is a wrap-up, Dan, because I
want to make one further substantive comment on this international
trade point. I think all the comments heretofore have been on the U.S.
company acquiring abroad. But I think there is a very real-and viewed
now in the sociological and political terms which the proponents of this
legislation presumably act upon, I think anyone would have to concede
that there is a good result from the establishment of onshore manufacturing facilities by a foreign-based multinational corporation. It brings
tax revenues into the United States. It makes for domestic employment.
All kinds of good things follow from the establishment of onshore
manufacturing facilities.

If the foreign-based multinational corporation is considering a
conglomerate acquisition in the United States, my guess is that it is not
going to be interested in any acquisition that would not trigger a spin-off
under the proposed legislation. If you are talking about a company with
an operation of $5 million or $6 million in sales, you can do that by your
own internal development efforts. You do not have to have onshore
manufacturing facilities for that kind of an operation. But if you want to
come into the United States in a big way, with onshore manufacturing
facilities, you almost inevitably will have to acquire a corporation,
conglomerate acquisition, that will trigger a spin-off under this kind of
legislation.
And I think that we are silly if we think that a Japanese conglomerate
or a German steel company or a French aluminum company or an
Italian chemical company is going to peel off some of its foreign assets to
set up onshore manufacturing operations in the United States. We
simply will not have those operations established. They will manufacture abroad and they will sell into the United States through distribution
arrangements. We will lose whatever economic and sociological benefit
would flow from the establishment of onshore manufacturing activities
by these companies.
MR. KOLB: Now, you may wonder how we are going to-decide who
won the debate. My conclusion is that anybody with his name tag still
standing is a winner.
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